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Immigration: The American Problelll 
Collles to Europe 
Today Europeans face a social and economic challenge that is far from new to 
Americans: the problem of assimilating millions of recent immigrants. Over the past two 
decades, at least twelve million southern Europeans, Asians, and Africans, comprising a 
kind of migrant proletariat, have arrived in northern industrial Europe. The question of 
whether and how they can be "integrated" into their host cultures and societies is much 
debated in those countries. Meanwhile, pressures are building up around the conflicting 
values of longtime residents and newcomers, and no satisfactory escape valve has been 
found, according to two Pacific News Service editors who have been reporting from 
Europe on immigration and minority issues. The following report by Frank Viviano and 
Frank Browning is based on articles they filed earlier this year while on assignment 
under a Fund grant. 
FOR MOST OF THIS CENTURY, the conflicts resulting from massive immigration were regarded by other developed countries as an "American problem." Indeed, Europe reaped substantial benefits from 
the phenomenon-and tacitly encouraged the westward flow 
of its poorly skilled, disenfranchised, and often politically 
restless millions into labor markets across the Atlantic which 
long seemed insatiable. 
But the American problem gradually became a global 
problem after World War Two, though recognition of its 
expanded scope lagged far behind the change. The war's 
human toll left an enormous shortage in the workforce avail-
able to meet the task of rebuilding shattered industrial infra-
structures. Japan alone undertook this task exclusively with 
its own citizenry. Elsewhere, and particularly in Western 
Europe, rebuilding was accompanied by an unprecedented 
influx of foreign "guest workers," mostly from the devel-
oping countries of the Mediterranean Basin. The net gain 
in immigrant population, moreover, was augmented by other 
waves set in motion by the dismantling of the empires of 
Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and, later, 
Portugal. 
Between 1960 and 1974, when the tide was at its strong-
est, the member states of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) issued residence and 
work permits for some 11.6 million immigrants. By 1980, 
the number of foreign residents had reached 4.2 million in 
France, 4.5 million in the Federal Republic of Germany, 
538,000 in the Netherlands, 422,000 in Sweden, and just 
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under a million in Switzerland. Millions more made a "South 
to North" move within their own countries-Sicilians to 
Turin and Milan, Bretons to Paris, Scots-Irish from Ulster 
to Manchester and Liverpool. The cumulative effect was a 
social challenge that few Europeans had foreseen, aggra-
vated by economic stresses that began growing early in the 
1970s and would reach crisis levels in the 1980s. 
In response came a unilateral decision by the European 
industrialized nations, implemented virtually everywhere by 
1975, to close the era of immigration. But that decision 
failed to come to grips with the human and cultural legacy 
left behind: in 1983 a deeply troubled series of nations-
within-nations stretches from the Baltic to the Pyrenees-
a Yugoslavia in Sweden, a Turkey in the Federal Republic 
of Germany, a West Indies in the Netherlands, a North 
Africa in France, an India and Pakistan in Britain, a Sicily 
in Switzerland. 
Nowhere are the paradoxes of this legacy more acute, or 
its many contradictions further from resolution, than in the 
crisis of Europe's "second generation," the children of its 
immigrant millions. 
The Disaffection of the Second Generation 
It is in France that the dilemma of "the second generation" 
has claimed the most serious attention. That is in part because 
of the inexhaustible Gallic preoccupation with cultural self-
identity, the endless dialogue over what it means to be 
French. Yet therein lies the challenge of the burgeoning 
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second generation, who by their visible presence are an 
affront to the unity of an historically homogeneous French 
culture. The demographic data dramatize the scope of the 
problem. In the last 20 years alone the total number of 
foreigners living in France has doubled, from just over 2 
million in 1962 to nearly 4.3 million today, comprising 8 
percent of the population. In the coming 20 years, that 
foreign population will grow steadily younger: current gov-
ernment projections indicate that some 60 percent of for-
eigners in the year 2000 will be under the age of 25. 
While they may speak the language fluently, these chil-
dren of immigration seldom identify themselves as French. 
They are often racially marked-as North Africans or West 
Indians-and they are frequently jobless. (In a Lyons indus-
trial suburb of 30,000 people, half the population is of 
foreign extraction; half of them are under the age of 25, 
and their unemployment rate runs 80 percent.) Increasingly 
they live in physical ghettos on the periphery of large cities, 
often the villes nouvelles constructed in the 1960s and 1970s 
specifically to house the flood of foreign workers. 
Typical is La Courneuve, a sprawling complex just north 
of Paris composed of two bare towers called "Le 4,000 
Nord" and "Le 4,000 Sud" because each building contains 
that many box-like flats. Parisians advise visitors not to 
intrude into the complex for fear they will be robbed or 
attacked, just as in New York the middle class avoids Bed-
ford-Stuyvesant or the South Bronx. At the ground level 
windows are broken. Heroin is easily available in the adja-
cent parking lot. There is no cafe within a mile. And the 
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\' young, dark-skinned Frenchmen who live in the complex 
say they feel thoroughly cut off: they are cut off from work, 
they are cut off from social integration with young, white 
French, and even more poignantly they are cut off often 
from their own heritage. 
They exist, in the French phrase, entre les dew: chaises, 
neither really Algerians or Moroccans or Antillaise, nor 
French citizens. Not too surprisingly, they are regarded as 
dangerous threats to respectable native French who fear that 
they are responsible for recent rises in juvenile crime and 
violence. Brought into France as their parents' incidental 
baggage, they now present themselves not as servants, not 
as temporary labor, not as the exotic boulevardiers of the 
cosmopolitan scene, but as Frenchmen with full title to the 
rights and privileges of the state. The result is that even on 
the left one hears subtle racial complaints. Just as the arbiters 
of linguistic purity complain against the intrusion of frang-
lais, so many others rail against the disintegration of cultural 
purity. As a writer in Le Monde noted recently, it is no 
longer rare to hear comments like the following at gatherings 
of even the most enlightened: "They are occupying our 
schools, there are too many of them in our resorts, they are 
taking over our neighborhoods. " 
France, of couse, is hardly alone. Similar dilemmas face 
Germany, where nearly 40 percent of the country's 4.5 
million foreigners are under 26. In tolerant Holland, the 
right-wing Nederlandse Volksunie party has called for the 
expulsion of all colored immigrants and foreign workers. 
Even in Sweden-where half the 200,000 immigrants are 
under 25-riots broke out last summer as gangs of Stock-
holm youths attacked a gathering of young Turks. Their 
message: Keep Sweden for the Swedes. 
The depressed economies that pervade all of Europe only 
intensify the conflict surrounding the second generation. 
Unemployment for the adult native-born population hovers 
around 10 percent, but for adult immigrants it is twice that, 
and for the second generation it runs above 60 percent in 
many industrial locales. Moreover, the birthrate among 
immigrant or ex-colonial populations tends to be much higher 
than for natives, leading some analysts to project an ever-
widening gap in years to come. In Rotterdam, for example, 
the immigrant birthrate is from three to five times that of 
the Dutch. Already one of every three babies born is to 
parents from Turkey, Morocco, or Suriname. Should these 
trends continue in Holland's largest city, the non-Dutch 
population could reach 25 to 30 percent by the year 2000. 
Cultural habits of the newcomers, compounded by pov-
erty, are putting ever more stress on the traditional Dutch 
commitment to tolerant assimilation. The black Surinamese, 
for example, come to Holland from a tropical peasant culture 
where the disciplined work habits of the stalwart Dutch 
business world are virtually unknown. For many of the 
Surinamese the adult Dutch seem a dreary, soulless lot whose 
children rebel by going to Amsterdam to become drug-
crazed squatters. 
Nowhere does there seem to be any ready solution to the 
troubles facing the second generation. Dutch government 
policy seems more ready now to acknowledge that assim-
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.. ilation is neither likely nor desirable even if economic equity 
is essential. In France, the ministries of youth, justice, and 
leisure have embarked upon a number of programs intended 
to enhance "social insertion," but increasingly the immi-
grant groups themselves have suggested that it is the very 
definition of French culture that must itself change, that 
native French culture and the immigrant heritage must together 
invent a new French identity. 
Taken altogether, these second generations pose what is 
surely the most profound challenge to the democratic and 
cultural stability of Western Europe in at least several cen-
turies. As the Swiss author and social critic Max Frisch 
expressed it, ''We called for workers and there came human 
beings." 
Ex-Emigrants Bring Savings and Problems Home 
In sharp contrast with the one-directional "safety valve" 
effect which normally governed relations between immi-
grant native lands and 19th century America, mounting pres-
sures attend both sides of the emigration relationship in 
contemporary Europe. 
The Italian South presents a graphic case in point. The 
combination of recession and more restrictive laws in North-
ern Europe has terminated the 25-year period of continuous 
immigration which most recently drained Italy of her young, 
and for the first time in memory "emigrati" are now flood-
ing back, at an estimated rate of 90,000 per year. They are 
bringing fundamental changes and unanticipated problems 
with them. 
Equipped with imported skills, tastes, and financial 
resources, returned immigrants are building what amounts 
to a separate world in their old hometowns and villages. 
The consequences include growing divisions between non-
emigrants and ex-emigrants, and the emergence of a dan-
gerously fragile economic bubble. The impact is being felt 
not only in Italy, but in Portugal, North Africa, Turkey, 
and Yugoslavia, where significant numbers of guest workers 
are also returning to their native lands. 
Almost everywhere in the Mediterranean, these devel-
opments can be visibly measured in a rash of outsized and 
often garish homes that Sicilians call "immigrant villas." 
Savings from industrial employment in the North have allowed 
thousands of immigrants to begin building such dream houses 
long in advance of their return. But what makes them pos-
sible as well are the low costs and wages in hometowns like 
Terrasini, a village perched above the Gulf of Castellamare 
20 miles west of Palermo. 
''Think of what it means to this economy, where the 
average person makes 8 million lire ($5,500) per year, when 
one of our immigrants builds a 100 million lire ($70,000) 
house," observes village clerk Grazia Zappa. "It drives all 
the prices up. It makes people change their ideas about what 
a decent wage is. It makes it very difficult for those who 
never left to continue living here." Behind all of the house-
building, says Zappa, is a "different way of looking at the 
world, a way that people bring home from the North even 
if they say the old-fashioned things are what they want." 
NUMBER NINE/AUGUST 1983 
Brought into France as their parents' 
incidental baggage, they now present 
themselves not as servants, 
not as temporary labor, 
not as the exotic 
boulevardiers of the 
cosmopolitan scene, 
but as Frenchmen 
with full title to 
the rights and 
privileges of 
the state. 
In 1982, according to Zappa, 90 of Terrasini's 1,500 
overseas citizens came back, most of them to open shops 
selling "modem" goods, or to go into businesses related 
to "modem" lifestyles. In a population of 8,000, their 
influence carries a great deal of weight. And to a surprising 
extent, their economic activity is focused on each other, or 
on the foreign tourists for whom they serve as seasonal 
intermediaries. One common pattern, say economists, is for 
returnees to employ other returnees in the relatively skilled 
positions required for building new homes according to 
northern standards, while non-emigrants are channeled into 
an unskilled day-labor force which offers little hope for self-
improvement. 
As Grazia Zappa points out, "it cannot last forever. Already 
some of the immigrant villas are being abandoned by people 
who can't afford to keep living that way" after savings from 
the North run out. Nevertheless, as long as a steady stream 
of returnees does keep washing in, the hardest workers 
among their immediate predecessors are able to maintain 
some semblance of the material life they left behind in 
Germany or Switzerland: automobiles, clothes, their own 
large homes. In the process, the distance between the emi-
grants and their stay-at-home cousins only increases. 
Such strains may seem inconsequential in themselves, 
but they are added to longstanding tensions in places which, 
like the Italian South, are already troubled by social con-
fusion and violence. This year, an estimated 85,000 Turks 
and Yugoslavs will repatriate from Germany alone, return-
s 
ing to dangerously unstable nations. "The greatest problem 
facing Portugal today is how to re-absorb more than 500,000 
immigrants from the past seven years,'' says Lisbon lawyer 
and journalist Antonio Santos. 
Conflicts in Values and Disparities in Treatment 
Ironically, what lies behind many returning emigrants is the 
same dilemma they provoke at home: an acute conflict in 
values. Economics may offer a root explanation for the 
impatience of the North to be rid of its now-superfluous 
guests, but economics is far from the sole element in today's 
bitter anti-immigrant sentiment or the restrictive government 
policies it has encouraged. In effect, the sheer presence of 
12 to 15 million immigrants is simply out of synch with the 
basic vision of the "good life" that well-meaning-even 
idealistic-northern Europeans have cultivated for a gen-
eration. 
Under the leadership of the various social democratic 
parties that have dominated northern politics for 25 years, 
social guarantees have become the common rule in Europe, 
especially in the job market. Unions, employers, and gov-
ernment have worked together to establish among the world's 
highest standards for job site conditions, hours, and wages. 
Immigrants, with typically larger families, more pressing 
immediate needs, and financial obligations in their native 
lands, have been willing to forego such guarantees. The 
fear is frequently voiced that the entire structure of work-
place standards has thus been jeopardized. "To make social 
guarantees effective in France, we must extend them to 
everyone who works here," says Alain Delpont, chief advisor 
to the French secretariat of state for immigration. 
Socialists in France and Social Democrats in Germany 
have pushed for a complex network of laws designed to 
protect what the modem world regards as basic human rights. 
But many immigrants have been raised in societies where 
the patriarchal family is the operative central unit of gov-
ernment, and where concepts like children's and women's 
rights are unknown. "Western society has moved a long 
way toward overcoming inequities in such areas as relations 
between men and women," points out Barbara John, the 
West Berlin Senate's commissioner for immigrants. ''There 
is a danger that the old world's way of handling these matters 
can disturb truly progressive norms and values.'' 
The average French Socialist or German Social Democrat 
is well educated, reasonably affluent, employed as a skilled 
worker or professional, and equipped with a world view 
and lifestyle that reflect these conditions. By contrast, for-
eign workers are found in relatively low-pay, low-skilled 
occupations, and their children seldom receive more than a 
rudimentary education. Indeed, a 1980 study in Germany 
found that nearly 37 ,OOO immigrant children had received 
no formal education at all in the previous year. 
"Disparities between the situations of national and for-
eign pupils in education are persisting and in fact are liable 
to increase," concluded an unpublished study of the prob-
lem compiled last year by an international agency. The 
result, it predicted, would be severe long-term handicaps to 
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"subsequent progress and social integration" in general. 
It is while caught on the horns of this dilemma that social 
democrats across Europe have gradually endorsed a prin-
ciple that was once associated primarily with right-wing or 
racialist politics. "The trend everywhere is rigorously to 
oppose any new immigration at all,'' says demography ana-
lyst Gianpiero Rellini of the OECD. 
"Our intention is to keep the door shut tight," confirms 
France's Alain Delpont, ''and to do everything in our power 
to improve conditions for those who are already inside our 
borders. " Accordingly, the Mitterrand government launched 
a highly publicized effort last year to legalize the status of 
undocumented workers, which added some 150,000 new 
names to the roster of 4.2 million legal immigrants already 
in France. 
Nevertheless, to make good on its "closed door" prom-
ise, Paris also instituted a "Third World Visa," a special 
permit for short-term visits by citizens of nations in Latin 
America and Africa, which is not required of tourists from 
the developed countries. Coming from the same Socialist 
government that called for a more open international eco-
nomic order at the Cancun North-South conference only 
seven months earlier, the new visa requirements struck many 
on the French left as grossly hypocritical. 
Similar reactions have greeted a German plan to offer 
financial inducements, in the form of pension and unem-
ployment payments, to immigrants who will agree to repa-
triate. Aimed largely at Germany's two million Turkish 
residents, the scheme was launched under former Social 
Democratic Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. Despite her own 
misgivings about differences in social values, West Berlin's 
Barbara John is among those who are dismayed by the 
payment idea. "We ought to be helping people who are 
now in Germany to integrate themselves successfully into 
our society, instead of trying to force them out," she says. 
No Workable Common Definition of Integration 
"Integration," however, is at the very heart of the problem. 
Its meaning is subject to many definitions, ranging from the 
wholesale absorption of foreign cultures into a homogeneous 
national whole, to movement toward something like an 
American-style cultural pluralism. A workable common 
definition, one that merges the needs of hosts and guests 
alike, has not emerged in the context of a European debate 
over immigration that often exceeds its American counter-
part in vitriolic content. 
The most striking evidence that social integration remains 
a distant dream lies in the abysmal record of northern Europe's 
"citizenship campaigns." Last year in West Berlin, for 
example, such a campaign was aimed at the 30,000 of the 
city's 120,000 Turkish inhabitants who are now eligible to 
become West German citizens. The effort netted exactly 50 
applicants. 
Implicit in this figure is a growing hostility toward north-
ern European life among the region's immigrants-a hos-
tility that sends some on the road back South, keeps others 




12 to 15 million 
immigrants 
is simply out of 
synch with the basic 
vision of the 'good life' that 
well-meaning-even idealistic-northern 
Europeans have cultivated for a generation. 
perplexed. "What puzzles me about their unhappiness is 
that our guest workers have some of the best wages and 
benefits in the world,'' remarks one Berlin official. 
Clearly, something more than economics accounts for the 
immigrants' reluctance to integrate, just as something more 
than economics accounts for the desire of the native-born 
to be rid of their foreign-born neighbors. In both instances, 
it is a matter of values; in both instances, the impossibility 
of turning back the clock-or of mounting truly satisfactory 
repatriation schemes-makes the incentive for a conciliatory 
approach enormous. 
But there is little reason to believe, based on the available 
evidence, that such an approach is in the offing. In fact, it 
might be argued that European immigrants are instead being 
asked to accept the ultimate terms of the American ''melting 
pot"-total assimilation-without any of the support mech-
anisms that helped generations of immigrants to the United 
States survive the ordeal. The most important of these mech-
anisms is the network of "old world" cultural links-the 
food stores, shops, and other bastions of popular life that 
gave the classic U.S. immigrant ghetto its peculiar flavor. 
Their absence is almost startling in such places as West 
Berlin's Kreuzberg district, an area of pre-War apartment 
buildings adjacent to the Berlin wall near Checkpoint Char-
lie that shelters 40,000 Turkish and Yugoslav residents. It 
houses the Federal Republic of Germany's densest concen-
tration of foreigners, but Kreuzberg offers few of the exotic 
street scenes that were once synonymous with immigrant 
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life. Indeed, it seems less an immigrant ghetto than a cultural 
desert-neither German nor Turk nor Yugoslav. While doz-
ens of stores that once served a predominantly German 
clientele have moved out with their old customers, virtually 
no immigrant enterprises have replaced them. 
The vast majority of immigrants, in fact, are legally pro-
hibited from opening stores. Their passports specifically 
exclude the legal "right of establishment" necessary to 
launch a private business. 
''The general opinion among Germans is that we asked 
for and needed workers, not entrepreneurs,'' explains Berlin 
commissioner-for-immigrants Barbara John. "Personally I 
don't believe that immigrants should remain workers if they 
have the energy to create their own employment opportun-
ities. But at present the laws make it very, very difficult. 
The permits are only for dependent labor.'' As in the United 
States and France, adds John, the ideal of cultural pluralism 
is under severe attack in Germany: "Our official policy is 
to promote diversity as a good thing ... but the German pop-
ulation is not well prepared for a multi-cultural society." 
Integration, in other words, must mean "strictly on Ger-
man terms," and the citizenship figures for eligible immi-
grants indicate that guest workers simply are not buying. 
Yet despite their deep resentment of the situation, they can-
not return to Turkey or Yugoslavia, either; current economic 
conditions there make Germany's 10 percent unemployment 
rate seem insignificant. Hence, Kreuzberg's empty streets 
and shuttered stores graphically reflect the limbo in which 
most of the past two decades' immigrants are effectively 
trapped. 
The dilemma is by no means limited to Germany. While 
France has had much longer experience with immigration, 
a massive influx from North Africa in the 1960s and 1970s 
has led to a hardening of French attitudes, even in culturally 
tolerant Paris. And French law, like German law, prohibits 
most recent newcomers from entering private business. 
Paradoxically, immigrants who arrived in Europe under 
the worst of circumstances are in some instances experi-
encing the smoothest transition: those admitted under ref-
ugee status are normally guaranteed the same rights as citizens, 
including the "right of establishment." The impact is read-
ily apparent in communities like the Porte d'Italie district 
of Paris, or the London suburb of Southall, where, respec-
tively, Southeast Asian and East-African Asian refugees 
have created thriving local economies based on their tra-
ditional needs and tastes. 
"The final irony is that these people are assimilated far 
more readily in the end," according to OECD immigration 
analyst Julian Aveling. He points out that in Sweden, where 
cultural supports for guest workers are deliberately encour-
aged, the rate of application for citizenship among Turks 
and_Yugoslavs is much higher than in the Federal Republic 
of Germany. 
Along with refugees, however, guest workers in Sweden 
comprise but a drop in the bucket of Europe's huge immigrant 
population. The real test of diversity's chances lies with the 
vastly more numerous guest workers of Germany, France, and 
Switzerland-an estimated 10 million people. $ 
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Consensus on NATO Lacking 
The International Alignment of 
Socialist Spain 
The 1982 national elections brought a socialist government to power in rpain for the 
first time. Last March the Fletcher School of Tufts University convened/~ two-day 
conference to explore the changes in relationships that might ensue b)tween Spain's new 
political leadership and the Western community of nations. The fol owing article is 
adapted from the presentation of Sr. Antonio Sanchez-Gij6n, din tor of Madrid's 
Institute for International Affairs, who traveled to Boston for th conference under a 
Fund grant. 
THE NEW SPANISH GOVERNMENT'S most articulate spokesman on diplomatic and defense matters, Foreign Minister Fernando Moran, has said that Spain can achieve "an area of autonomy that will 
prevent its reduction to satellite status and make possible a 
dynamic and original foreign policy in consonance with the 
vitality of Spanish society." But, in its first months, the 
foreign policy of the government led by the Socialist Work-
ers Party (PSOE) has been subjected to criticism, misinter 
pretation, and even misrepresentation. 
A certain semantic carelessness is partly responsib for 
this state of affairs. By threatening to maintain an equ· istant 
position between the two blocs and to join Franc in dip-
lomatic initiatives in the Mediterranean and Lati America, 
and by stating an unwillingness to wait for mbership in 
the European Economic Community past 19 , top Socialist 
officials have managed to give a rough-he n appearance to 
Spanish foreign policy. By turns it ha seemed negative, 
revis,ionist, and pretentious. 
___ ,· I,' fact, two constant principles derlie the definitions 
, ofinternational policy framed by e Socialist leaders, espe-
cially party head and Prime Mi 1ster Felipe Gonzalez and 
ForeignMinister Moran. If d med in clear policy terms, 
tliese,principles could perfe y well serve to orientate the 
search for the broad natio 1 consensus that would permit 
Spain to act with greate reassurance and freedom inter-
nationally. 
Spain Unwilling to e Anyone's Satellite 
The first of these rinciples is the need for Spain to attain 
the maximum ssible degree of autonomy in the interna-
tional system 
In the Socialist view, both the Franco regime and the 
democratic governments led by the centrists (UCD) suffered 
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from an · ternational inferiority complex, which obligated 
them t yield to the demands of stronger powers and blocs, 
chie y the Atlantic Alliance and the United States. To 
So ialist policymakers, Spain's strategic and diplomatic 
pendence reached its apogee in 1953, when agreements 
ith the United States on military bases were signed by an 
internationally isolated, authoritarian regime that was mark-
edly repressive at home and, because of its inadequate inter-
nal legitimacy, very much in need of protection from abroad. 
These agreements contained secret clauses giving Wash-
ington the power to use Spanish territory for the pursuit of 
its aims without consulting or obtaining the authorization 
of the Spanish government. 
Over the years, thanks to arduous diplomatic negotiations, 
it has been possible gradually to recover part of the sov-
ereignty that was lost. However, the price paid has been a 
general process of pragmatic adaptation to transnational con-
straints, especially in the economic and financial spheres. 
Internationally, the Socialist Workers Party's final objec-
tive is to overcome the divisions of the contemporary world 
into opposing politico-military blocs. It campaigned last year 
on a promise to work toward greater autonomy for Spain 
by gradually separating it in military terms from the North 
Atlantic bloc. No sooner had the Gonzalez government been 
formed last December than it signaled its willingness to 
forego political solidarity with its NATO allies by refusing 
to sign the final communique of the NATO Council in 
December. "We consider it more honest not to underwrite 
the spirit of a document which, inter alia, would involve 
the sanctioning of the installation of new missiles in Europe,'' 
declared a spokesman. 
A few days earlier, during his investiture speech, Prime 
Minister Gonzalez announced that the government would 
reexamine Spain's relations with the United States and up-
hold the campaign pledge to hold a referendum on NATO 
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